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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
)

UNION BANK, N.A., a national
banking association,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)
)

vs.
JV L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendant/Appellant,

And
NORTH IDAHO RESORTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendant/Appellant,

And
PEND OREILLE BONNER DEVELOPMENT,
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, DAN JACOBSON, an
individual, SAGE HOLDINGS LLC,
an Idaho limited liability
company, TIMBERLINE
INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
STEVEN G. LAZAR, an individual,
an individual, AMY KORENGUT, an
individual, HLT REAL ESTATE
LLC, PANHANDLE STATE BANK, an
Idaho corporation, R.E. LOANS,
LLC, a California limited
liability company, WELLS FARGO
FOOTHILL, INC, a Delaware
corporation, PEND OREILLE
BONNER DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS,

DOCKET NO. 424 79

)

(Bonner County
Case 2011-0135)

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT' S BRIEF

INC., a Nevada corporation,
PENSCO TRUST CO. custodian
f/b/a Barney Ng, a California
corporation, MORTGAGE FUND '08
LLC, a California limited
liability company, B-K
LIGHTING, INC., a California
corporation, FREDERICK J.
GRANT, an individual, CHRISTINE
GRANT, an individual, RUSS
CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, an Arizona
limited liability company,
JOSEPH DUSSICH, an individual,
MOUNTAIN WEST BANK, an Idaho
corporation, STATE OF IDAHO,
Department of Revenue and
Taxation, MONTAHENO INVESTMENTS
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, TOYON INVESTMENTS LLC,
a Nevada limited liability
company, CHARLES W. REEVES and
ANN B. REEVES, husband and
wife, ACI NORTHWEST, INC., an
Idaho corporation, DOES 1
through 20 inclusive,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants/Respondents.

)
)

* * * * *
Appeal from the District Court of the First
Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Bonner

* * * * *
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL GRIFFIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

* * * * *
Gary A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Attorney for Appellant, JV

Christopher Pooser
Stoehl Rives, LLC
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900
Boise, ID 83702-7705
Attorney for Respondent, Bank
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i)

NATURE OF THE CASE.

The First National Bank hereinafter "Bank" brought this
action to foreclose on a 5.0 million dollar mortgage
recorded March 25, 2008 against the landowner, Pend Oreille
Bonner Development, hereinafter "POBD".

The real estate was

called Lake Front on Pend Oreille Lake in Bonner County,
located at "Trestle Creek", which will be used to describe
the real estate at issue.
go to default/judgment.

The owner, PODB, let the action
There were several other

Defendants, one being JV, LLC who had the first priority
Mortgage recorded June 19, 2006 on Trestle Creek and the
other Defendant was the vendor who sold to POBD, being
identified as North Idaho Resorts, hereinafter "NIR".

The

Bank sought priority over JV by reason of a Subordination
Agreement recorded August 6, 2008.

This appeal is by JV.

NIR has an appeal in this action, but filed under a separate
docket number.
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(ii) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
The course of the proceedings in the trial and hearing
below and its disposition by the District Court involved:
The Bank filed a Complaint and then an Amended
Complaint.
Claim.

JV filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-

The Counterclaim by JV was to foreclose its June 19,

2006 Mortgage on Trestle Creek.
JV filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which

was denied.
The Bank filed a motion for partial summary judgment,
which was granted.

JV moved to amend, alter, and reconsider the partial
summary judgment, which was denied.

JV sought production of

the Debt Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement,
dated 19 November, 2010, which was denied, except for a
redacted version.
The case went to trial; but the District Judge by
Letter denied JV to participate at trial.

At trial the

judge announced a bifurcated trial, which did not allow JV
to proceed on its Counterclaim - only on its cross-claim
against NIR.

The action was tried and the court rendered

its findings/conclusions and a final judgment was entered in
favor of the Bank, JV filed this Appeal.
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(iii) STATEMENT OF FACTS.
JV held the initial first mortgage on Trestle Creek,
recorded June 19, 2006, which mortgage was granted by the
Trestle Creek owner, POBD.

POBD was developing a golf

course with Lots to sell at a separate location called the
Idaho Club and on a property called Moose Mountain.

POBD

needed money for the Idaho Club and Moose Mountain, but very
little development was going on at Trestle Creek by POBD.
POBD had no banking relationship with the Bank, in
California.
Bolby 40%.

POBD was owned by Reeves 20%, Merschel 40%, and
Merschel and Bolby had substantial business

dealing with the California Bank, so they proceeded to get a
short term loan from their Bank in California.

Bolby and

Merschel arranged for a Bank loan of $5,000,000 to POBD, by
giving personal loan guarantees and by each pledging
collateral of cash deposits at the Bank, $2.5 million each,
for a cash collateral pledge of $5.0 million.

The

California Bank was doing several million dollars of
business with Merschel and Bolby, but had no business with
POBD.

There was no real estate collateral mortgage at all.

The loan was disbursed by the Bank to POBD's bank in
Sandpoint, Idaho by wire transfer.

The Bank first deducted

some financing fees and some prepaid interest, leaving $4.5
million as the wire transfer.
29, 2007.

This occurred about October

This loan was short-term and became due.

POBD

could not pay the $5.0 million loan, so to extend the loan
-6-

for a term of years the Bank took a mortgage from POBD
recorded March 25, 2008, on the Trestle Creek property in
Idaho.

The Bank obtained a Loan Policy of Title Insurance

from First American Title Company of Sandpoint, Idaho.

A

copy of that Loan Policy was furnished and is in the record
of this action.

The Loan Policy insured the Bank for its

March 25, 2008 loan Trestle Creek, showing it as a second
recorded mortgage behind JV's existing June 19, 2006
mortgage for $2.65 million secured on Trestle Creek, in the
Loan Policy by showing as a Special Exception to coverage
for item 26 being JV's June 19, 2006 Mortgage.

As of the

March 25, 2008 mortgage to the Bank, the Bank held the $5.0
million cash pledges of Marschel and Bolby plus a second
mortgage on Trestle Creek.

The only loan money disbursed by

the Bank was the October 29, 2007 wire transfer of $4.5
million to POBD's bank account in Idaho.

The Bank did not

ever disburse any more or further loan money.

The Bank

disbursed no money for the March 25, 2008 loan secured by
its mortgage.
Merschel and Bolby wanted to get their $5.0 million
cash pledge released.

The POBD manager in Idaho was Charles

Reeves and he went to James Berry the manager of JV to
solicit a subordination agreement putting JV's June 19, 2006
mortgage behind the March 25, 2008 Bank Mortgage,

Since

POBD already had the entire October 29, 2007 loan money, and
had granted as additional security the mortgage recorded
-7-

March 25, 2008 on Trestle Creek the issue arose of how to
turn the Bank's second position mortgage into a first
position mortgage, so Herschel and Bolby could get their
$5.0 million cash collateral released. The Bank had no
involvement on that matter.

To accomplish getting JV to

subordinate its 1 st lien mortgage securing 2.65 million owed
to JV by POBD, Reeves contacted Berry, manager of JV, and
made representations that POBD was getting a ~ loan of
$5.0 million to put into the development of Trestle Creek,
condominiums, townhouses, and improvements on the real
estate, which would increase Trestle Creek's value and from
the sales produce additional income to JV for additional
partial mortgage release payments from POBD to JV.

POBD and

JV negotiated and recorded a two-part Third Amendment to
Indebtedness and to Real Estate Security, and Subordination
Agreement recorded June 24, 2008 (it is at R., Vol. VI, pp.
1380-1384).

Part of that Third Amendment covered Moose

Mountain which is not at issue, but for Trestle Creek JV
agreed (paragraph 7. b) to subordinate its present first
lien priority to "***a~ (emphasis added) first lien
priority of no more than $5,000,000.00."

The provisions for

JV to receive partial mortgage release payments was for
$20,000.00 per condominium and $20,000.00 per single platted
Lots.
The additional promises and representations are
explained in the Affidavit of James Berry, plus 3 emails
-8-

from POBD's lawyer Sterling.
facts were true.

None of these represented

Attorney Sterling himself prepared another

Subordination Agreement, at Reeves' request and emailed i t
to JV's counsel for Berry.

The 3 emails from Sterling were

all after the 2007 loan and the 2008 mortgage to the Bank;
however, they fraudulently stated that Chuck (Reeves) was
working on negotiating a loan from the Bank for
$5,000,000.00.

The Subordination Agreement was drawn to

look like the Bank was involved and a Bank Officer would
sign it.

After JV signed, no one from the Bank signed it,

the Bank never even saw the Subordination Agreement.

POBD

never made any payments to the Bank, and when the Bank
ordered a foreclosure litigation report in 2010 - the
Subordination Agreement showed up as a recorded document.
The Bank then seized on the Subordination Agreement and
filed this action to foreclose its March 25, 2008 Mortgage.
JV defended on it not being "an agreement", it was
ambiguous, there was no consideration to JV, and the
representation, promises, and facts made through Reeves and
Sterling's emails made the Subordination Agreement
unenforceable and rescinded.
The facts formed the basis of this lawsuit.

-9-

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
I.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S FAILURE TO GRANT JV JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADING IS ERROR.

II.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR THE BANK AS TO PRIORITY BASED ON THE
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT, WAS NOT BASED ON
UNDISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, AND THE BANK
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
SO THE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING JV'S MOTION TO
ALTER/AMEND THE GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMM'1l..RY JUDGMENT,
AS THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO CONSIDER JV'S
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND EMAIL LETTERS FROM POBD'S
ATTORNEY STERLING.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW JV
TO DISCOVER THE DEBT RESTRUCTURE AND SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, DATED 19 NOVEMBER, 2010 BETWEEN THE
BANK, MERSCHEL, AND BOLBY, EXCEPT FOR A REDACTED
VERSION.

V.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S LETTER, DATED APRIL 30, 2014,
IN DENYING JV THE DUE PROCESS OF THE TRIAL,
REASONABLE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD WAS
ERROR BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

VI.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE, AT OPENING OF THE TRIAL
ANNOUNCED THAT A BIFURCATED TRIAL WOULD BE HELD,
DENYING DUE PROCESS TO JV.

VII. THE ISSUES PRESENTED ABOVE, ISSUES IV, V AND VI,
ALL
INVOLVED
PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS BY THE
DISTRICT COURT, CONCERNING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS
(JV'S JUNE 19, 2006 MORTGAGE) OF JV.
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

JV does not claim attorney fees on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S FAILURE TO GRANT JV JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADING IS ERROR.

The Bank filed a Complaint (R., Vol. I, p. 65) and then
a First Amended Complaint (R., Vol. I, p. 122).

Both

pleadings alleged the Bank's Mortgage was recorded August 6,
2008 and the JV's Mortgage was recorded June 19, 2006. The
First Amended Complaint, Factual Allegations, paragraph 32
allege the Bank's Mortgage recording date,

(R., Vol. I, p.

128), and in paragraph 42 alleged JV's interest to be a
mortgage recorded June 19, 2006 (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 132,
paragraph 43).
The First Amended Complaint does not have any factual
allegation that JV's Mortgage was "subordinate" to the
Bank's Mortgage.

The only mention of such a word

(subordinate) is in the Bank's Prayer for Relief, was as to
its First Claim For Relief, which was merely to reform the
legal description, which includes paragraph 3 at the 3 rd
line down, i t states that the interest of every Defendant is
"***subject to, subordinate to, and junior to and inferior
to Plaintiff's Mortgage as reformed... ".

(R. , Vol . I, p.

135) .
As to the Second Claim for Relief (Mortgage
Foreclosure) request for relief (prayer) in paragraph 5,
seeks "For a determination that the lien created by the Note
and Mortgage is valid, enforceable and existing as against
-12-

the Defendants and the property described herein, and for a
decree of foreclosure."

(R. , Vol I, p. 135, para 5) .

Nowhere does i t allege the Bank's Mortgage is of any
particular "priority", nor that it is a 1st priority
mortgage.

A complaint must conform to I.R.C.P.

8(a) (1) (2) a

short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.

"The purpose of the complaint is to

give defendant information of all material facts on which
plaintiff relies to support his demand, which facts may be
stated only in ordinary and concise language." (Fox v.
Cosgul.£; 64 Idaho 448, 133 P.2d 930 (1943).

"The prayer of

a complaint is nothing more than a statement of the
pleader's opinion of what the facts stated in the complaint
entitles him to receive."
173 P. 970 (1918).

(Smith v. Radna, 31 Idaho 423,

This is because, "Prayer for relief

forms no part of statement of cause of action; facts alleged
and not relief demanded are of chief importance."
(Dahl.quist v. Mattson, 48 Idaho 378, 233 P. 883 (1925).

JV's Answer to First Amended Complaint, Counterclaim
and Cross-Claim, in paragraph 61 alleged its Mortgage
recorded June 19, 2006, is first in time/first in right by
Idaho's statutory race-notice recording acts, and in
paragraph 62, that the interest of the Bank by its recorded
Mortgage is inferior to the recorded mortgage of JV.
Vol. I, p. 191, paras 61 and 63).
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(R.,

In summary, neither the Bank's First Amended Complaint,
nor the Answer/counterclaim by JV allege any facts about or
the wording "Subordination Agreement".

The Subordination

Agreement was outside of the factual pleadings of either the
Bank or JV; however the Court denied JV's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, stating that "The Court has not
considered any matters outside the pleadings." (Order
Denying Motion, R. Vol IV, p. 928).

Without any alleged

facts, other than the respective mortgage recording dates,
i.e., Bank on August 6, 2008, and JV on June 19, 2006.

The

District Court should have granted JV's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleading.
The Court erred in failing to grant JV's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.
The Court stated that it considered only the pleadings
however the pleadings being admitted as true were that the
Bank's Mortgage of August 6, 2008, was recorded subsequent
to JV's Mortgage recorded June 19, 2006.

There is no

factual basis alleged to the contrary.
II.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR THE BANK AS TO PRIORITY BASED ON THE
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT, WAS NOT BASED ON
UNDISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, AND THE BANK
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
SO THE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED.

Based on the standards for granting a summary judgment
it was an error by the District Court.

The District Court

accurately set forth the LEGAL STANDARDS, but erred in
applying them to the facts and law.
-14-

The Bank argued that

its Mortgage (2008) was superior in priority to JV's
Mortgage (2006) because of a Subordination Agreement
(recorded August 6, 2008).

(See, Subordination Agreement, R.

Vol IV, pp. 952-958).
JV asserted that the Subordination Agreement was not
binding on JV based on the Affidavit of James W. Berry, his
Affidavit testimony (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1234-1236) is, as
follows:
para 5 -

the Bank gave no consideration for its 2008

Mortgage.
para 6 -

JV had no contract or agreement with the

para 7 -

The Bank never presented the Subordination

Bank.

Agreement to JV.
para 8 -

The owner, POBD, through Charles Reeves,

manager, contacted Berry about August 1, 2008, and told him
POBD had managed to arrange a $5.0 million loan from a bank,
and the funds would be used to finish platting and building
improvements, Condominiums and Townhouses, at Trestle Creek.
para 9 -

Reeves told Berry that in order to receive

the $5.0 million for those purposes, JV would need to
subordinate its Mortgage to a new mortgage.

It was not

disclosed that POBD, in 2007, had already borrowed and
received the $5.0 million from the Bank, and that the money
was already spent. Reeves did not disclose that there would
actually be no money coming to POBD for platting or
-15-

construction use at Trestle Creek.
para 10 - Reeves told Berry that the $5.0 million loan
from the Bank would be spent on Trestle Creek for
improvements and construction that would enhance the value
of the real estate securing JV's Mortgage by at least the
$5.0 million.
para 11 - Reeves promised that the new Bank loan would
be used to build Condominiums or Townhouses to be sold, and
that POBD would pay JV for partial releases of JV's
Mortgage.
para 12 - The $5.0 million to POBD from the Bank would
increase the value of JV's Mortgage security and would
increase monetary payments by the partial releases as
Condominiums and Townhouses were sold.
para 13 - JV did not know that the $5.0 million loan
from the Bank had already occurred in 2007.
para 14 - JV received nothing; no consideration for the
Subordination Agreement, and the Subordination Agreement was
obtained from JV on the fraudulent misrepresentations of Mr.
Reeves.
para 17 - Reeve's representations to JV was that 83
Condo Units and 13 Townhouses would be built on the Trestle
Creek property using the $5.0 million to be borrowed from
the Bank, and as POBD sold these, i t agreed to pay JV, in
addition to the regular monthly payments, for partial
releases at $20,000.00 per Condo Unit and $20,000.00 per
-16-

Townhouse.

The color copy drawings from Reeves given to

Berry for platting Condominiums and Boat Storage, were
attached to Berry's Affidavit.
para 18 - about the time of the Subordination
Agreement, August 1, 2008, POBD made no more payments to JV
on its note and mortgage, there were never any condominiums
or townhouses built, and POBD went into default on any
payment or performance to JV to date (15 July 2013).

The

Bank did not file any Affidavit(s) contravening Berry's
Affidavit.
JV further submitted its Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and
attached four (4) different documents which were the Bank's
records of the 2007 loan, the money disbursement from the
Bank to POBD

for $4,500,000.00 on October 29, 2007, the

Loan Agreement POBD/Bank October 29, 2007, personal
guarantees from Marschel and from Bolby, and the October 29,
2007 Pledge Agreements whereby Marschel and Bolby each put
up Pledged Collateral of deposit account no. 101435493 with
the Bank limited to $2,500,000.00, plus interest (by
Marschel)

(R., Vol VI, p. 1278)) and for Bolby deposit

account no. 100065580 at the Bank - $2,500,000.00.

(R., Vol.

Vi, p 1293).
The October 29, 2007 loan to POBD by the Bank, had no
real estate security, but it had personal guarantees of
Bolby and Marschel, and the Pledged Collateral accounts at
-17-

the Bank ($2.5 million each) totaling $5,000,000.00 posted
as cash collateral.
The Bank did not file any motion, objection, or
affidavit contesting Berry' Affidavit for JV.

The hearing

on the Bank's Motion was telephonically on July 29, 2013 and
it is transcribed at Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 14-55.

At the

argument, JV's attorney pointed out that the Subordination
Agreement was recorded by First American Title, a non-party
to it.

There was a place on the Subordination Agreement for

signature of the Bank by Name: ______~(_N_i_r_a_j_Ma_h_a_h_a_r_a-J~·>-,
Title: Senior Relationship Manager, but i t was NOT signed
for the Bank by Niraj Mahaharaj, or at all.
Agreement, R., Vol. 4, p. 954).

(Subordination

The Subordination Agreement

was only signed by JV, by its managers, and for POBD, by
Charles Reeves, its President.

The Bank's actual loan

documents had no wording about getting a real estate
mortgage or a Subordination Agreement - nowhere.

The Bank's

attorney, at argument admitted the loan documents do not use
the word subordination.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p 51).

The Bank, by Affidavit of Terrilyn S. Barron, as
subsequent record keeper, furnished a Credit Authorization,
Summary Purposes, last sentence saying,
"Portion of the proceeds will pay-off a
$2,000,000 private seller carryback note
originating from the purchase of the subject
property in June 2006" (It is in the record,
R., Vol. V, p. 1035).
-18-

Obviously, that private loan originating from the
purchase of the real estate at Trestle Creek is the June 19,
2006 first mortgage ($2.65 million) to JV, granted by POBD
at the date it acquired the Trestle Creek property,

On the

same page is "Description: Assignment of deposit totaling
$5,000M Chip Bolby MMA#100065580; $2,500M, Thomas Marschel
MMA#l01435493; $2,500M.
In other words, POBD was to use the 2007 Loan of $5
million to pay-off $2.0 to JV, which i t did not do.

The

Bank being well secured with the collateral deposits
totaling $5 million.
District Court entered a Memorandum on Partial Summary
Judgment Re: JV, LLC, and an Order Granting Partial Summary
Judgment Re JV, LLC that the Bank's Mortgage recorded March
25, 2008 had priority over JV's Mortgage, recorded June 19,
2006.

(R., Vol. VI, pp. 2342-1346)
The Court's Memorandum is the only "finding/conclusion"

made by the Court, next to last paragraph:
"that a valid subrogation (sic) contract was
entered into by which JV's mortgage was made
inferior to UB's Mortgage."
(Memorandum - 4, R., Vol. VI, p. 1343)
The Court used the word "subrogation", but probably
meant "subordination". JV submits there was no "contract" at
all with the Bank - the Bank did not sign the Subordination
Agreement.

The District Court went on to find the Plaintiff

(Bank) is clearly the beneficiary of the contract, which was
-19-

never raised by the Bank.

The Subordination Agreement

stated "Creditor agrees with FNB".

JV is the creditor and

FNB is the Bank as a contracting party, but FNB (Bank's)
signature line is blank - unsigned at all, so there is no
contract/agreement between the Bank and JV.
The Affidavit of Jam.es Berry stated that JV received no
consideration, yet the District Judge found there was
consideration, meaning he had to have weighed conflicting
evidence to the contrary.
At the oral argument on the Bank's partial summary
judgment motion, the Bank's Attorney John Miller during oral
argument admitted, in reference to the Subordination
Agreement, that there is a signature block for the Bank to
sign, but the Bank was never presented the document to sign
before i t was recorded.

(Tr., Vol 1, p. 23, 11.1-5).

JV's Affidavit of Jam.es Berry set forth elements of
fraud defined as:
Fraud.
[25-28] "Fraud consists of '(1) a statement
or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity;
(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's
intent that there be reliance; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the
statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8)
justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant
injury.'"

Washington Federa1 Sav. V. Van Enge1en
153 Idaho 648 at 657 (2012)
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STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
The District Judge's grant of partial summary judgment
to the Bank was only on the issue of priority of mortgages.
JV pled

a

Counterclaim to adjudicate the amount of money

owed JV and to foreclose its mortgage in a one-action rule
foreclosure.

(R. , Vol.

I, pp. 185-189) . The District Judge

set forth the correct standards, but then entirely ignored
the Affidavit of Berry as to creating factual issues.
District Judge failed to apply IRCP 56 (c)

The

or IRCP 56 (d) .

These Rules say the summary judgment shall be rendered if
the pleadings,
affidavits

depositions,

submitted

admissions,

show

no

genuine

together with the
issue

as

to

any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.

(IRCP 56 (c)) .

Further,

the

District Judge's partial summary judgment did not conform to
IRCP 56(d) because the only issue was priority of mortgage
as a partial summary judgment, which was not rendered upon
the whole case for all relief asked. The District Judge did
not make any required Order specifying the facts

without

controversy,

the

not

controversy,

and

facts

controverted,

directing

further

the

relief

proceedings

in

in
the

action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v.
411 at 417

(2012),

Lawrence,

135 Idaho

the Idaho Supreme Court uses the same

"Standard of Review"

on appeal as
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is

to be used by the

District Court's original ruling.

The standard is that,

"[1-3] On appeal from the grant
for summary judgment, this Court
same standard of review used by
court originally ruling on

of a motion
utilizes the
the district
the motion.
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, OLOLC, 140
Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as matter of law."
I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The facts must be liberally
construed in favor of the non-moving party.
v.
Idaho State Dep't 0£ Agric., 149
Idaho 777, 779, 241 P.3d 950, 952 (2010).
When an action will be tried before a
court without a jury, the court may, in
ruling
on
the
motions
for
summary
judgment, draw probable inferences arising
from the undisputed evidentiary facts.
Drawing probable inferences under such
circumstances is permissible because the
court, as the trier of fact, would be
responsible
for
resolving
conflicting
inferences
at
trial.
However,
if
reasonable persons could reach differing
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences
from the evidence presented, then summary
judgment is improper.

Renzo

Citing,

al.so

to

Losee

v.

Idaho

Idaho 219, 222, 220 P3d 575,
(internal citations omitted)."

148
(2009)

Co.,

578

The Capstar, supra, 153 Idaho 411 at 416, held that all
the evidence presented genuine issues of material fact, and
that summary judgment was not a proper method to dispose of
a case with so much conflicting evidence.
The instant case should not have been resolved on the
partial summary judgment motion.

JV opposed the motion with

documentary evidence and the Affidavit of James Berry.

The

Bank did not object to any of the Affidavit of James Berry
-22-

and the Bank did not submit any affidavit disputing James
Berry's Affidavit.

The Affidavit of

James

Berry created

genuine issues of material fact preventing a partial summary
judgment.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING JV'S MOTION TO
ALTER/AMEND THE GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
AS THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO CONSIDER JV'S
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND EMAIL LETTERS FROM POBD'S
ATTORNEY STERLING.
Part of JV's Motion to Alter, Amend, and Reconsider was
submitting additional facts and evidence taken from the
actual recorded Third Amendment of June 24, 2008, and
Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 to Berry's deposition, which were
from Attorney Sterling - attorney for POBD
No 5 - Sterling's letter of March 31, 2008
No 6

Sterling's letter of July 24, 2008 (12:07p.m.)

No 7

Sterling's letter of July 24, 2008 (4:27p.m.)

POBD's Attorney Sterling's Involvement
The misrepresentation of facts that were submitted by
Attorney Sterling to induce JV to sign the Subordination
Agreement came in 3 emails sent by Sterling for JV's
attorney's consideration.

These were produced by JV as

Exhibits at the deposition of James Berry.

The 3 emails are

Berry Exhibits No. 5, 6, and 7, in support of JV's Motion
for the Court to alter and amend its Order Granting Partial
Summary Judgment, are in the appeal record in R. VI, p.
1386, 1387, and 1388, as follows:
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Attorney Sterling email of March 31, 2008 (R., Vol. VI,
p. 1386.
Attorney Sterling forwarded copies of his March 31,
2008 email to Reeves, Marschel and Bolby in which he says he
represents the Idaho Club working closely with Chuck Reeves
and his partners (Marschel and Bolby).

Chuck Reeves is

negotiating a loan from First National Bank (the Bank) in
Monterey, California in the principal amount of
$5,000,000.00.

Berry and his entity JV has agreed to

subordinate its mortgage on the Lake Parcels (Trestle Creek)
which is currently in first position, to a ~ (emphasis
added) first in favor of FNB.

Sterling states his

understanding that JV is amenable to subordinating its
mortgage to any new first which takes out and replaces the
FNB first.
JV submits that this email is false because by its date
of March 31, 2008, POBD (the Idaho Club) has already
received the $5.0 million from the Bank on October 29, 2007,
and had spent it paying creditors.

A "new first lien" is

also false because 5 days earlier POBD had already given the
Bank a mortgage on Trestle Creek for 5 million, recorded
March 25, 2008, which was then a new second priority lien
behind JV's June 19, 2006 mortgage.
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Attorney Sterling's email of July 24, 2008 (R., Vol.
VI, p. 1387).
As of July 24, 2008 Sterling is aiming to close the
initial funding by Monday, but that First National Bank has
been very, very, slow in responding.
JV submits this is false because the Bank's second
priority mortgage was already recorded March 25, 2008, 4
months previous.
Berry Exhibit (R., Vol. VI at page 1388).
Attorney Sterling writes to JV's attorney and copies
Mr. Reeves, dated July 24, 2008.
obtained a loan commitment.

He states Mr. Reeves has

Reeves/Sterling are in a "taffy

pull" with First National Bank (the Bank), that is causing
all the delay.

At the closing of the first draw POBD

proposes to leave Jim Berry's JV, LLC deed of trust (sic)
lien in first position on the Lake Parcels (Trestle Creek).
This is the security position he has now.

POBD would make

certain payments to JV per the Third Amendment to the Note
by August 1, after which JV would subordinate its lien on
the Lake Parcels to the lien securing First National Bank's
lien.

Attorney Sterling recognizes that JV had requested a

title report, but Sterling doesn't furnish it because it
will confuse matters more, and because i t does not show the
Third Amendment to the JV note.

It shows a subordination

which will be cancelled at close of escrow.
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JV submits that even though Attorney Sterling on July
24, 2008 states the title commitment does not show the
recorded Third Amendment, i t was in fact recorded June 24,
2008.

It is also false, because the Bank had the Loan

Policy of Title Insurance insuring the Bank's March 25, 2008
recorded Mortgage, "subject to", Special Exception No. 26
from the coverage by reason of JV's June 19, 2006 recorded
first priority loan.
JV made a Motion to Alter and Amend the Partial Summary
Judgment Re: JV, LLC and a Motion to Reconsider (R. Vol VI,
pp. 1361-1388) and supported it with a Memorandum and
supporting documents from depositions of Berry and of
Reeves.

This Motion pointed out that the Bank filed no

affidavits in opposition to the Affidavit of James W. Berry
(filed September 15, 2013).

As a fact the Bank gave no

consideration and did not even enter into or sign the
Subordination Agreement, the Subordination Agreement had
conflicting provisions making it ambiguous and it was an
error for the Court to "weigh" matters and conclude
otherwise.

JV's Motion to Alter, Amend and Reconsider, was
supported by additional documents, including a Third
Amendment between JV and POBD (by Reeves) recorded June 24,
2008, in which JV agreed as follows:
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"b. On the Trestle Creek property the
present first lien priority of JV, LLC shall
be subordinate and inferior to the new
(emphasis added) first lien priority of no
more than $5,000,000.00".
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1366)

JV contended that the Bank's 2007 loan of $5.0 million,

and the Bank's second priority mortgage recorded March 28,
2008 could not be a new first lien as stated in the Third
Amendment recorded much later on June 24, 2008.

Further,

the Subordination Agreement, first paragraph stated it was
entered into by and between the Bank and JV for a loan now
or hereinafter made by FNB.

A loan "hereinafter made" must

be a loan made at a later date.

The Bank loan of $5.0

million had long since been made on October 29, 2007.
Rule 42 (b)
may order a
rule.

Separate Trials, states that the court, ... ,

separate trial,

for the reasons stated in the

In the instant action,

the District Court did not

enter any "order" about separate or bifurcated trial.

The

District Judge did not follow Rule 16(b) to enter a pretrial
order, or Rule 42(b) to order separate trials.

The District

Judge's Letter of April 30, 2014, denying JV the opportunity
to be in and at the trial of the Bank's lawsuit, is in error
and should be set aside by the Supreme Court and a new trial
be ordered.
"It is axiomatic that, evidence may not be admitted
before an objection is considered and determined," (stated
in Neld, supra, 156 Idaho 802 at 814).
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When the trial commenced, because of the District
Judge's Letter of April 30, 2014, JV and JV's counsel were
seated, not at counsel table, but in the audience.

The

Court recognized this by saying:
"***In
the
Courtroom
also
is
Mr.
Finney
representing JV, LLC.
Does he have the hearing
thing back there?"
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 106, 11. 3-4)
The
reference
to
the
"hearing
thing
is
a
headphone, hearing aid, furnished by the bailiff
to persons with hearing issues.
The first part of the suddenly bifurcated trial was the
Bank v. NIR, the vendor of Trestle Creek to POBD, as Buyer.
On the Bank's case Mr. Reeves, as officer/manager of POBD
testified about the mortgage debt to JV that,
a)

POBD was assuming a note from JV Loans, which is

referred to as the Berry Note.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 119, 11. 1-7)
b)

the JV loan was probably in the range of one and a

half to $2 million range.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 119, 11. 16-18)
c)

Reeves recalled receiving, in October of 2007, $5

million loan proceeds.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 123, 11.1-12)
d)

In March of 2008, POBD proceeded to provide

collateral for the loan on the lake properties for the $5
million loan he had just talked about.

(lake properties is

Trestle Creek).
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 126, 11. 19-22)
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e)

The initial $5.0 million was borrowed in October,

2007, but the bank wanted some collateral, so we gave them
some collateral - signed the document for collateral on the
Lake.

JV

(Lake is Trestle Creek), which was March 25, 2008.

submits the Bank had 5.0 million in cash collateral.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 127, 11. 1-9)

Mr. Reeves became subject to cross-examination by
Attorney Weeks, counsel for NIR, and he testified the loan
from the Bank was with a gentleman named Niraj Mahaharaj.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 149, 11. 17-21)

Reeves didn't directly deal

with the Bank because his 2 partners (Marschel and Bolby)
had the lending relationship.
25)

(Tr., Vol 2, p. 151, 11. 16-

Reeves was working with JV to get its Mortgage

subordinated to the Bank.

POBD's attorney Sterling was

working on getting a mortgage subordination agreement.

(Tr.

Vol. 2, p. 164, 11. 1-8).

JV, to make i t perfectly clear, states the Bank didn't
loan any money on Trestle Creek in March 2008 because the
money was already loaned based solely on the credit and cash
pledges of Marschel and Bolby on the October 29, 2007 loan,
which was due January 29, 2008.

(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 173, 11.

13-32) .
Reeves, on further cross-examination, testified and
admitted,
a)

POBD assumed the JV note and never paid it.

Vol. 2, p. 174, 11. 20-25).
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(Tr.,

b)

Part of the purchase and sale was to assume the

note, and then i t became our obligation, and POBD was in
breach of the agreement because it hasn't paid the JV note,
we are in breach because we assumed the JV loans and haven't
paid that back.
IV.

(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 175, 11. 1-9).

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW JV
TO DISCOVER THE DEBT RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT AND
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, DATED 19 NOVEMBER, 2010
BETWEEN THE BANK, MERSCHEL, AND BOLBY, EXCEPT FOR
A REDACTED VERSION.

JV prepared for the Trial which was set for May 12 and
13, 2014, by filing JV's Pretrial Memorandum, Witness, and
Exhibits plus JV's Amended Exhibit List A through S.
At the hearing on December 20, 2013, JV's attorney
asked for discovery of a "global settlement" (Debt
Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement, dated 19 Nov
2010) by the Bank and Merschel, Bolby, and POBD.

This would

undoubtedly cover facts of this action by the Bank against
POBD, as i t is the "global settlement" between the Bank and
POBD, plaintiff and defendant in this action.
p. 95).

(Tr., Vol 2,

When JV's counsel, at a hearing on December 20,

2013 said he had a preliminary motion seeking a "global
settlement" document.

The Bank's attorney Miller said "I

don't have a problem giving him the global settlement
document.

(Tr., Vol 2, p. 96, 11. 9-11).

Through discovery, JV had tried to obtain a Debt
Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement reached
between POBD and the Bank, which District Judge Griffin
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refused to compel the Bank to disclose, except for a heavi1y
redacted copy.

The Court's Order Re: Discovery was filed

April 18, 2014 (R., Vol. II, p. 1539) denying JV's request
for the Bank to produce the full Debt Restructure and
Settlement Statement, dated 19 November, 2010, made with the
Bank by Bolby, Merschel, and POBD.

The District Judge

ordered that only a redacted copy (filed under seal) be
furnished to JV.

The Court wrote that "it did not find the

agreement to be relevant to the remaining issues in this
case; however the document may lead to discovery of relevant
evidence."

(Order Re: Discovery, R., Vol. VII, p. 1539).

The Court did not state or define "the remaining issues" or
how the document may lead to relevant evidence.
JV submits that the document could not be used to lead
to discovery of relevant evidence

because the District

Judge refused furnishing the entire document to JV. The
redacted Debt Restructure and Settlement Agreement, is in
evidence as Defendant's NIR Exhibit SSS, and in paragraph 3
Reaffirmation of Obligations - i t was agreed that all of the
terms and conditions of the Loan Documents would remain in
force and effect.

JV submits that clause would mean that

the Bank still held the 5.0 million cash collateral from
Bolby and Merschel; however, JV believes the 5.0 million was
released from the Collateral Pledges, and either returned to
Merschel and Bolby or applied to other debt they had at a
Monterey, California Bank.

This issue also involves
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procedural due process.
V.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S LETTER, DATED APRIL 30, 2014,
IN DENYING JV THE DUE PROCESS OF THE TRIAL,
REASONABLE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD WAS
ERROR BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

Shortly before trial, with no notice or opportunity for
JV to be heard, District Judge Griffin wrote a "letter" of
April 30,

2014 stating JV and JV' s counsel, Attorney Gary

Finney, could not be present at counsel table for the Bank's
case, and could only be a spectator.

JV then filed a

written Objection and Motion to Set

Aside the Court's Letter to Counsel, dated April 30, 2014,
and Motion to Reconsider (R., Vol. VII, pp.1658-1667).

The

District

and

Motion,

Judge

did

not

even

take

up

JV' s

Objection

which pointed out that the Court's Letter,

not in

Order form, denied JV due process, notice, opportunity to be
Further that any of the District

heard, and a fair trial.
interlocutory

Court's

could

Orders

still

be

altered,

amended, and set aside at any time on JV's motions, as long
as made within fourteen

(14)

days of the final

judgment.

JV's Objection and Motion was specific, and pointed out that
Nield v.

Pocate11o Health Service,

stated as the standard -

filed February 14, 2014

that the trial court, on a motion

to reconsider, is required to consider any new or additional
facts

that

bear

on
"A

reconsidered.

the

correction

rehearing

or

involves new or additional facts,
presentation

of

both

law

and
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of

the

order

reconsideration

being

usually

and a more comprehensive

fact."

(Nield

v.

Pocatello

Hea1th Service, 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 714 (2014)).

The

Court's

Letter

denying

and

JV

counsel

to

participate at trial in defense of the Bank's lawsuit fails
to comply with Rule 16(b) Final pre-trial procedures.
16 (b)

states,

court shall

at least thirty

(emphasis added)

(30)

IRCP

days before trial,

the

engage in a pretrial process,

and shall be on the record and any rulings of the Court
shall be reflected in minute entry prepared as ordered by
the

Court.

denying

In

JV

this

any

instant action,

opportunity

to

the

be

Court's

heard

or

Letter

even

participate in the trial is contrary to Rule 16(b).

to

Also,

the District Judge did not comply with Rule 56 (d).
Bank's

only

judgment.

pretrial

motion

was

for

a

partial

The

summary

Rule 56(d) required the District Judge to specify

facts deemed established and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.
pretrial

In

order,

this
was

action

on

the

the

District

Bank's

motion

Court's
for

judgment on priority on the Bank's 2008 Mortgage.
filed

any

summary

memorandums

and

judgment motion.

judgment motion,

affidavits

to

JV

only

the Bank' s

only

summary
JV never

responded by

partial

summary

JV was entitled to be at the trial and to

defend and assert its Counterclaim against the Bank.

VI.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE, AT OPENING OF THE TRIAL
ANNOUNCED THAT A BIFURCATED TRIAL WOULD BE HELD,
DENYING DUE PROCESS TO JV.

The case was set for Trial.

JV prepared and filed a

Trial Memorandum, JV's Exhibits, and JV's Witness List.
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A

few days before trial, the District Judge wrote a letter to
counsel stating that JV could not participate in the trial
and could not sit at the counsel table.
District Judge opened by stating,

At the Trial the

for the very first time

that, he was bifurcating the trial, first would be the Bank
against defendant, NIR, and then JV against NIR/V.P.,
on JV's cross-claim.

Inc.

JV had pled a counterclaim against the

Bank, which the Judge did not mention.

Somehow the District

Judge seemed to believe that everything was final in the
Bank's favor against JV,

even though the summary judgment

was

single issue of priority of the

only partial on

the

Bank's Mortgage against JV's Mortgage.

JV submits the Court

prior ruling was only an "interlocutory" Order.
The Bank's case went to trial against NIR, without JV
being able to participate at all.

Then JV went to trial on

its cross-claim against NIR/V.P., which is not an issue on
this

appeal.

problems

as

The
not

District

complying

ultimately corrected.
It

is

Agreement",

undisputed

Court's

with

IRCP

judgments
54(a),

had

some

which

were

This appeal results by JV.
that

the Bank,

did not sign "this

did not record it, and did not know where the

original was

located,

and it was not referred to in the

Bank's Policy of Mortgage Insurance (Policy No. 2291210-S).
The

Bank

first

found

out

about

the

existence

of

the

Subordination Agreement when the Bank obtained a mortgage
foreclosure report for this action filed January 28, 2011,
-34-

about three
entitled

(3)

years after

GUARANTEE

by

Litigation Guarantee,

the fact.

First

This document is

American

Title

Company,

to the Bank, as the Assured, date of

guarantee is December 27, 2010 in the record at R., Vol. V,
pp.

1064-1082.

This was the first time ever showing the

recorded Subrogation Agreement in Special Exception,

Part

II,

Rick

Exception

No.

24

(at

R.,

Vol.

V,

p.

1069) .

Lynskey, for First American Title Company, in support of the
Bank's

motion

for

partial

Supplemental Affidavit,

summary

furnishing a

judgment

made

a

copy of the original

Loan Policy issued by First American Title Company on March
25, 2008, the date of recordation of the Bank's Mortgage in
this matter.

The Loan Policy of Title Insurance issued by

First American Title is Policy No. 2291210-S at R., Vol. V,
pp. 1087-1099.
not

disclose

The Loan Policy, dated March 25, 2008, does
the

Subordination

Subordination Agreement was

Agreement,

because

not recorded until August

the
6,

2008.
The Bank could not have relied upon the August 6, 2008
Subordination
October 29,
on

March

Agreement

because

its

loan

of

money

was

2007, and its Mortgage was recorded previously

25 ,

approximately

2 008 .
four

The
(4)

Bank' s

months

Mortgage

before

the

was

recorded

Subordination

Agreement was recorded August 6, 2008. In summary, from the
Bank' s

own

Loan

Policy,

it actually knew or

should have

known by constructive notice that JV had a prior recorded
-35-

Mortgage

on

June

19,

2006,

and

the

Bank

held

a

later

subsequent mortgage recorded March 25, 2008, almost two (2)
years later than JV's Mortgage.
JV points out that the District Judge's statement that
the "court's prior summary judgment disposed of all issues
between JV,

LLC and Union Bank" is inaccurate because the

Bank's motion was only a partial summary judgment motion on
the issue of priority of mortgages, so i t could not be that
"all issues were disposed of".

Secondly, the Court's prior

partial summary judgment was only interlocutory, meaning i t
could be changed at any time,

with the cut-off date being

fourteen (14) days after final Judgment.
The District Court by Letter said JV will not be at
counsel table.

At the trial commencement, on the record the

District Court said that it would be a bifurcated trial.

As

to JV that meant JV could only try its cross-claim against
NIR.
VII. THE ISSUES PRESENTED ABOVE, ISSUES IV, V .AND VI,
ALL
INVOLVED
PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS BY THE
DISTRICT COURT, CONCERNING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS
(JV'S JUNE 19, 2006 MORTGAGE) OF JV.
These

two

(2)

statements/directives

of

the

deprive JV of a fair trial, without any due process.

Court
First,

JV responded to the Letter by JV's Objection and Motion to
set aside

the Court's Letter to Counsel,

2014 and Motion to Reconsider.
response,

no

hearing

was

30,

The District Judge made no

held,

disregarded by the District Judge.
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dated April

and

it

was

apparently

The Letter and the District Judge's statement at trial
commencement as to his "bifurcating" the trial, both came
without notice,
heard - at all.
process rights.

without hearing,

and no opportunity to be

This is the denial of JV's procedural due
The Idaho Supreme Court case of Bradbury v.

Idaho Judicia1 Counse1,

136 Idaho 63, 28 P.3d 1006

on the issue of procedural due process holds:
"2.

Procedural Due Process

A procedural due process inquiry is focused
on determining whether the procedure employed
is fair.
The due process clause of the
Fourteen th Amendment "prohibits deprivation
of
life,
liberty,
or
property
without
'fundamental fairness' through governmental
conduct that offends the community's sense of
justice, decency and fair play."
Maresh v.
State, Dept. 0£ Hea1th and We1£are, 132 Idaho
221, 225-26, 970 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1998) citing
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34, 106
S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 428-29
(1986). Procedural due process is the aspect
of due process relating to the minimal
requirements of notice and a hearing if the
deprivation of a significant life, liberty,
or
property
interest
may
occur.
A
deprivation of property encompasses claims
where
there
is
a
legitimate
claim
or
entitlement to the asserted benefit under
either state or federal law.
See id. Citing
Board 0£ Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569,
92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 556
(1972) .
The minimal requirements are that
"there must be some process to ensure that
the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of
his rights in violation of the state or
federal constitutions.
This requirement is
met when the defendant is provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard."
Aberdeen-Spring£ie1d Cana1 Co., 133 Idaho at
91, 982 P.2d at 926, citing State v. Rhoades,
121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P. 2d 960 969 (1991) ;
see a1so A.E. 11Ed" Fridenstine v. Idaho Dep't
0£ Administration, 133 Idaho 188, 983 P. 2d
842 (1999). The opportunity to be heard must
-37-

(2001),

occur "at a meaningful
time and in a
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the
due process requirement. Aberdeen-Spring£ield
Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P.2d at 926,
citing Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho
923, 927, 950 P. 2d 1262, 1266 (1998) ; see
also City 0£ Boise v. Industrial Comm'n, 129
Idaho 906, 935 P.2d 169? (1997) ."
Due

process

is

a

flexible

concept

warranted by the particular situation.
in a two-step process.
liberty or property.

called

for

as

A court must engage

First is whether the interest is in
If so, the Court next determines what

process is due.
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Counsel,
136 Idaho 63 at 72

In

the

instant

action,

the

District

Court

did

not

engage in any of the due process requirements or in the twostep analysis.

JV's property interest was to have a trial

on matters of its property interest,

i.e.,

JV' s

June 19,
It was

2006 Mortgage encumbering the real estate at issue.

fundamentally unfair for the Judge's Letter ruling and its
announcing

bifurcation

of

the

JV' s

trial.

property

interests are created by existing mortgage foreclosure laws
and Idaho case law.
"The

United

property interest,
States

States

Supreme

Court

has

noted

that

under the 14 th Amendment to the United

Constitution are created ..by existing rules ... such as

state law."
132

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that,

Idaho

(Maresh v.

221

at 226,

State,

970

Dept.

P. 2d 14

0£ Health

(1998) .

and Wel£are,

Idaho's due

process clause of the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section
-38-

13, is "substantially the same as its federal counterpart,
and Idaho considers the rational used in deciding Fourteenth
Amendment due process cases."
Without being granted any due process by the District
Court, JV could not establish its property right in its 2006
Mortgage.

Even if JV only had a second priority mortgage it

should have been allowed to go to trial.

The District Court

should be reversed and a new trial granted to JV.
Procedural

Due

Process

interest matters of JV' s
requires
States

due

June 19,

process.

Constitution,

concerning

Under
the

2006

both

right

the

JV' s

property

recorded Mortgage
Idaho

to procedural

requires... "a fair trial in a fair tribunal."

and United
due process

(cases cited)

(Wi11iams v. Idaho State Board 0£ Rea1 Estate Appraiser, 157
Idaho 496,

337 P. 3d

(2012)

at 157 Idaho,

page 505) .

Due

process is not precisely defined but the phrase expresses
"fundamental fairness".
Rea1 Estate Appraiser,
fairness

procedural

(Wi11iams v.

Idaho State Board 0£

157 Idaho 496 at 505).
due

process

calls

for

Fundamental
procedural

protections as are warranted by the particular situation.
(Wi11iams v. Idaho State Board 0£ Rea1 Estate Appraiser, 157
Idaho 496 at 501).
In the instant action, three

(3) matters denied JV of

procedural due process which are:
1.

The District Judge's refusal to require the full

Debt Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement to JV's
-39-

counsel, on discovery.
2.

The District

Judge's

Letter of April

30,

2014,

denying JV and counsel to be involved in the trial by POBD
against JV and NIR.
3.

The District Judge's announcement,

at the trial

commencement, that he would proceed to try the POBD case and
then separately try the JV cross-claim against NIR.

-40-

CONCLUSION
1.

JV's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should

have been granted.
2.

On the Bank's motion for partial summary judgment

as to mortgage priority, the District Judge stated the
correct standards, but did not apply those standards.

The

Bank's motion should have been denied.
3.

JV's motion to alter, a...uend, and reconsider the

District Judge's granting of a partial summary judgment to
the Bank should have been granted based on the standards for
summary judgment.

4.

The Court's refusal to furnish the Debt

Restructure and Settlement Agreement was error.

The

"redacted" version could not lead to any relevant discovery.
This resulted in an "unfair trial" for JV, especially
because the Court's Letter of April 30, 2014 denied any
trial to JV as relates to JV and the Bank, concerning their
respective mortgages.

5.

The Court's Letter of April 30, 2014, denied due

process to JV.

6.

The Court's "bifurcated" trial denied due process

to JV.
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF

JV requests the Idaho Supreme Court to reverse the
District Court and its final judgment and to remand the
action for trial on all the issues.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

0~
_O_
day

of September,

2015.

Gary
Finney
Attorney for Ap

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing was served as indicated, this
3:::*:: day
of September, 2015, and addressed as follows:
Christopher Pooser
Stoehl Rives, LLC
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900
Boise, ID 83702-7705
VIA US MAIL
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